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THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

COLONEL DUANE H.SMITH, USA
structure was under intensive review. Deputy
Secretary Packard announced the outcome of
this review July 8, 1971. The organizational
changes, to be effective January 1, 1972, fall
far short of those which had been under
speculation in military circles; they will be
discussed later. The purpose of this article is
to analyze the unified command structure,
examine various proposals for its change, and
suggest improvements.
Because organizations are shaped by the
goals they seek to attain, the combatant
commands should be organized t o carry out
our national military strategy. Reduced to
fundamentals, that strategy presently calls
for:

( I s t h e present unified command
structure adequate for insuring unity o f
effort of land, sea and air forces? Would
t h e peacetime organization require
change i f the US went to war? If change
is indicated, what should be the change
be?)

ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE

The United States currently manages its
combatant forces and their direct support
through an organizational structure of one
specified and seven unified commands. These
combatant commands are meant to provide
the mechanism for achieving two vital aims:
unity of effort of land, sea, and air forces; and
a peacetime organization which doesn't need
t o be changed to go to war. Our ideas about
unified commands have been evolving steadily
since World War II although no adjustments
have been made to the Unified Command
Plan since 1963. However, Secretary Laird's
military posture statement t o the Congress in
March 1971 and several news items during the
past year have clearly indicated that the

c strategic nuclear retaliation against a
nuclear attacker,
o defense of the United States,
s peacetime participation of US forces in
mutual security arrangements, including
deployment in strategic areas overseas, and
c rapid deployment of mobile forces based
in the United States t o conduct operations as
directed.

Arguments have been put forth over the
years that our unified command structure
should be simplified t o conform to our
military objectives. While many variations
have been proposed, the common theme is
one of functional and area commands. That is
to say, there should be two functional or
mission-oriented commands, one for all
strategic forces and one for deployable,
US-based, general purpose forces; and there
should be oversea area commands as needed.
The concept is attractive for its apparent
simplicity but needs careful examination
because some forces serve both a strategic and
tactical role, and functional and area
responsibilities don't always separate cleanly.
Although the proposed structures may

m
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appear simplistic, that appearance results
partly from comparison with the existing
structure which, as the following examples
show, is unnecessarily awkward.

frequently abandoned the structure and gone
t o a d h o c command and operating
arrangements. Or as budgets have become
tighter, we have increasingly been forced to
scrutinize the cost and effectiveness of the
many headquarters in the structure. And
questions about the appropriateness of
"politico-military" activity by the Defense
Department in areas such as Latin America
and Africa have caused us to review the need
for headquarters like USSOUTHCOM and
USMEAFSA.
Despite these sorts of pressures, as well as
changes in the international scene, and more
recently the implications of the Nixon
D o c t r i n e , we have not adjusted the
organization for eight years. Why this is so
can be attributed primarily to a reluctance to
change while our attention was focused on
the war in Southeast Asia. It must be noted
too, though, that the structure determines the
number of senior military positions in the
Defense Department and relates directly to
the roles of the Services. Such matters are
never treated lightly and normally involve
strongly held, differing, Service viewpoints
which are difficult to resolve.
A major reflection of the pressures for
change is the 1970 report of the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel. That group, chaired by Mr.
Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, said:

e Strategic nuclear retaliation is performed
by four commands. Two elements of the
strategic offensive forces, bombers and
land-based missiles, are assigned to the
S t r a t e g i c Air Command (SAC), while
sea-launched missiles, the third element, are
d i s p e r s e d t o t h e Atlantic Command
(LANTCOM), the US European Command
(USEUCOM), and the Pacific Command
(PACOM).
e Strategic defensive forces in the
Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD)
operate independently from the strategic
offensive forces.
.There
i s n o s i n g l e commander
responsible for the defense of the United
States.
e N e i t h e r t h e A l a s k a n Command
(ALCOM) nor the US Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) has a "broad, continuing
mission" and "significant forces of two or
more Services" which would warrant a unified
command (as prescribed in JCS Pub 2,
Unified Action Armed Forces).
Where one command suffices for the
Pacific Ocean area and Asia, we employ two
for the Atlantic Ocean area and Europe.
*The US Strike Command (USSTRICOM)
was established primarily to implement our
r a p i d d e p l o y m e n t strategy, and has
subsequently been assigned responsibility for
the MEAFSA area. In practice, however, we
have used the command merely to manage the
movement of forces to other commands, and
we have called on USEUCOM to carry out
USSTRICOM contingency plans .in the
MEAFSA area.

Serious questions persist about the
suitability of the Unified Command
structure for the conduct of war, either
general or localized, for the conduct of
peacetime activities, or for the handling
of recurring crises. An examination of the
primary missions of the present
commands and some of the specific
problems indicates that the present
structure is not effective, and probably
would have to be radically changed to
support a major war effort.

One can argue the seriousness of these
anomalies, but they are the kinds of flaws
that have caused the unified command
structure to be less than fully responsive to
national military objectives, and thus subject
to pressures for change. The pressures
themselves arise from interacting forces. For
example, in crisis situations, we have

That is strong, almost sweeping, criticism.
One must look to the specific flaws in the
organization, as they were perceived by the
Fitzhugh Panel, to determine the basis of its
criticism. Although the combatant command
organization is not discussed in great detail in
15

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

the Panel's report, the following particulars
were identified and appear to be those which
led the Panel to its conclusions:
0 Strategic offensive forces are not under
one commander.
0 Crisis situations in the Middle East have
given rise to ambiguities and conflicts
regarding c o m m a n d responsibilities.
USCINCMEAFSA has responsibility for the
area, but ad hoc arrangements involving
USCINCEUR are consistently set up.
*Although
CINCAL has an area
responsibility, he functions primarily as an air
defense region commander in CONAD.
eLANTCOM does not function as a
unified command in that it has no significant
Army or Air Force forces assigned.
0 USEUCOM and PACOM are primarily
oriented to operations in their geographic
areas of responsibility, but each also has a
strategic nuclear retaliatory role.
@Unity of command has not really been
achieved because the commander of the
unified command controls the combatant
forces through his component commanders
rather than directly, and because the
component commanders remain responsible
to their Services for matters other than
operations.
.Where subordinate unified commands
have b e e n established (principally in
PACOM), a d d i t i o n a l ambiguities are
introduced. In some subordinate unified
command areas operational command is
exercised by CINCPAC through the
component commanders, but in others it is
exercised through the subordinate unified
commander. Additionally, each subordinate
u n i f i e d command has component
commanders, so the split responsibility (to
the operational commander and to the
Service) is repeated at the level of the
subordinate unified command.
0 Commanders of unified and specified
commands do not participate effectively in
the processes of material development, or
programing and budgeting, because these
matters are handled essentially within Service
channels.

Based on the preceding considerations, the
F i t z h u g h Panel m a d e the following
recommendations regarding the unified
command organization (shown schematically
in Figure 1).
0 Three new unified commands should be
created: a Strategic Command, a Tactical (or
General Purpose) Command, and a Logistics
Command.
The Strategic Command would be
composed of SAC, CONAD, fleet ballistic
missile organizations, and the Joint Strategic
Target Planning Staff (JSTPS).
0 The
Tactical Command would be
composed of "all combatant general purpose
forces of the United States assigned to
organized combatant units." Its creation
would involve these changes:
- merging
LANTCOM
and
USSTRICOM,
- a b o l i s h i n g USSOUTHCOM and
reassigning its functions to the merged
LANTCOM/USSTRICOM, and
- abolishing ALCOM and reassigning its
general purpose functions to PACOM, its
strategic defensive functions to the new
strategic command.
@ The
Logistics Command would be
composed of theater logistics commands
(which are not further defined or discussed in
the report) and would supervise the support
activities for all combatant forces. Included
would be supply distribution, maintenance,
traffic management, and transportation.

Do the Fitzhugh proposals remedy the
organizational shortcomings? Let's look first
at strategic forces, both offensive and
defensive, which would be brought together
under the new strategic command.
Clearly, any use of strategic offensive
forces must be precisely coordinated. Under
existing procedures, coordination is achieved
through the Single Integrated Operations Plan
developed by the JSTPS (an agency of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff). T h e key question is
whether joint planning can assure the unity of
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effort that could be provided by a single
commander. Our total institutional military
experience would seem to answer no. By
dispersing the strategic offensive forces and
relying on a plan to integrate their use, we
have raised the operational direction of the
forces to the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
That means the Joint Chiefs of Staff must
deal with four commanders regarding the
readiness (with all that implies) of the
strategic offensive forces. This day-to-day
operational direction should not be confused
with a national decision to launch nuclear
strikes; that decision plainly rests with the
President, but preparing for and carrying out
such a decision should be the undiluted
responsibility of a single force commander.
Looking at strategic defensive forces, we
see dramatic changes over the past ten years.
As the threat has shifted from aircraft to
missiles, there has been a steady decline of
Army antiaircraft forces and Air Force
fighter-interceptor forces. Emphasis is shifting
to antiballistic missile defense systems. But
regardless of the composition of the defensive
forces, their use is unalterably tied to the use

of offensive forces. We will use both or none,
and these staggeringly complex weapon
systems operate in the same physical space.
Because the operations are indivisible, unity
of command is essential. We are again drawn
to achieving this unity through a single
commander.
The concept of a unified command for all
strategic forces is sound; that we have never
established one is a consequence of divergent
Service views. The Navy, for example, has
consistently held that differing views are
healthy, that reliance on a single strategic
concept would be fatal, that sea-launched
missiles would not have been developed if
"bomber only" proponents had prevailed.
However, when discussing the organization
and management of the armed forces it is
i m p o r t a n t to distinguish between the
direction of forces in combat at the unified
command level and the formulation of
national military strategy at the governmental
level. Debate and analysis are vital at the
national level, but unified direction is vital at
the operating level.
In his strong dissent to the Fitzhugh
17

organization for the general purpose, or
tactical, forces? To answer that we first need
to examine the nature of these forces, their
employment, and their current organization.
I t was noted at the outset that general
purpose forces are tasked to defend the
United States, to help defend other nations
according to US treaty commitments, and to
conduct operations as directed by the
President. The forces are now assigned t o six
a r e a commands: ALCOM, LANTCOM,
USEUCOM, PACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and
USSTRICOM/USMEAFSA. Each commander
has an assigned area within which he is
responsible for all activities ranging from
combat operations (should they occur), to
security of US personnel and property, to
contingency planning, to military assistance
m a t t e r s . Additionally, CINCSTRIKE is
c h a r g e d with providing a reserve of
combat-ready forces to reinforce other
unified commands, and with the joint training
of these forces.
Historically, area unified commands came
i n t o peacetime usage after the Joint
Congressional Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor recommended in 1946 that
action be taken to insure that "unity of
command is imposed at all military and naval
outposts." From 1946 t o 1963 the command
structure was frequently rearranged to
a c c o m m o d a t e changing concepts and
commitments. Actual unification has been
elusive, however, as we tended to establish
separate commands where the interests of a
single Service were dominant. Until 1957, for
example, there was a US Northeast Command
which was primarily an Air Force command.
Until 1963 there was a US Naval Forces,
E a s t e r n A t l a n t i c a n d Mediterranean
Command. And the Caribbean Command,
now expanded into the US Southern
Command, has always been predominantly
Army oriented. While the 1963 plan moved
toward a more practical and more truly
unified organization, it is fair to observe that
the structure has always been influenced by
Service (as distinguished from national)
interests.
The most significant, and unresolved,
impact on the structure results from the US

Report, panel member Robert C. Jackson
argues for continued decentralization of
strategic offensive forces. He contends that
SAC, CONAD, and fleet ballistic missile
operations are too diverse to be "married,"
that the joint plan provides adequate
coordination, that an intervening command
echelon would be unwieldy. One can agree
with the last point that placing a super
c o m m a n d between existing combatant
commands and the Washington level, as
Fitzhugh recommends, is sheer layering.
Whereas the amalgamation of strategic forces
is needed, it seems better to accomplish this
by disestablishing SAC and CONAD and
bringing all offensive and defensive forces
together into a new unified command which
has Army, Navy, and Air Force components.
The operations of these components in the
strategic arena are no more (and probably
less) diverse than those of the general purpose
land, sea, and air forces which we successfully
combine in our existing unified commands.
Opponents of a strategic command also
argue that designating forces according to a
strategic or tactical function is cumbersome,
that naval aviation, for example, carries out
both strategic and tactical roles, that assigning
these forces t o one functional command
would deny their use in the other role. It
should be noted, however, that the planned
use of tactical air forces is a small and
declining part of the strategic offensive
pattern, or that the continued assignment of
strategic bomber (B-52) forces to SAC has
been n o bar to their use as general purpose
forces in Southeast Asia.
To be sure, worldwide command and
control of all strategic forces by a single
commander is a formidable task, but we are
not without experience in these matters, and
on balance the benefits appear worth the
effort. The panel recommendation for a
strategic command would achieve this aim
but the recommendation should be modified
to avoid simply putting another layer over
existing commands. The reorganization of the
unified command structure announced by Mr.
Packard makes no changes regarding strategic
forces.
Do the Fitzhugh proposals provide a better
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strategy of rapid deployment which emerged
during the 1960s. Begun under former
Defense Secretary McNamara, there continues
today active study and analysis to determine
what forces in what proportions (of both
combatant forces and supporting mobility
forces) are needed to carry out the strategy.
After 10 years these typcs of questions
persist:

way we want to be in war. In addition to
these oversea area commands, we need a
unified command in the United States to
serve as the mobile command and manage a
variety of tasks, such as:
—Deploy forces under the command of a
mobile task force headquarters to conduct
operations outside the jurisdiction of the area
commands.
Defend the United States from other
than nuclear attack.
* Direct military assistance matters in areas
o u t s i d e t h e jurisdiction of the area
commands.
* Conduct joint training and develop joint
doctrine.
—Provide augmentation forces to other
unified commands.

0 What forces should
be stationed in
oversea areas? And where?
— How much prepositioning of equipment
overseas or afloat should we do? Where?
How much airlift and sealift capability do
we need (or can we afford)?

Answering those questions is a dynamic
process involving constantly changing and
interacting forces. But the answers directly
influence the unified command structure. For
instance, USSTRICOM was established early
in the Kennedy administration as a mobile
unified command to fight limited wars; a
trained force based in the United States ready
to move quickly to project US power
overseas. But left unanswered has been the
apparent contradiction of maintaining both
this kind of a mobile command as well as
oversea area commands. If there is an area
commander t o receive and fight the forces
deployed from the United States (as
CINCPAC has been doing and USCINCEUR
would do in a NATO/Pact war), is a unified
c o m m a n d needed just t o provide
augmentation forces to the area commands?
On the other hand, if we wish to (or must)
base forces primarily in the United States and
deploy and fight them as required under
command of CINCSTRIKE, do we need area
commands?
The answer appears to lie in a careful
balance of both a mobile and area commands
(which must be reviewed regularly for
adequacy). As long as the United States has
treaty commitments involving the active,
peacetime participation of US forces, area
commands overseas will be necessary. These
commands offer the advantages of being
on-the-ground, thus better prepared to fight
and more able to be organized in peace the

Returning now to the Fitzhugh proposal,
w h i c h w o u l d reduce general purpose
commands to three and place them within
one super command (shown as the Tactical
Command in Figure 1.), it appears that again
the panel has gone too far. One applauds the
idea of rationalizing the commands because
there are too many, but creating a new layer
between them and the Washington level
simply encumbers the system. Nor is it
consonant with the panel's objective to
organize the combatant forces into a structure
which would "reduce the number of staffs
and staff sizes to the minimum consistent
with actual needs." Both Mr. Jackson and Mr.
McNeil i n their dissenting statements
emphasize the fundamental objection to
creating another command echelon: it brings
about a large staff without any clear
contribution to the management process.
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS

So if we reject the concept of the super
command for tactical forces, but accept the
need for both a US-based mobile command
and oversea area commands, what can be
done to streamline the structure?
0 ALCOM could
be disestablished. The
Alaskan Air Defense Region must of course
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USSTRICOM would erroneously combine
Atlantic naval forces with a command having
worldwide responsibilities, rather than with
an area command (USEUCOM) for which
those forces have an affinity.
e US STRICOM/USMEAFSA could be
reshaped as the Mobile Command and
assigned the functions already discussed as
appropriate for the US-based unified
command (many of which are now performed
by USSTRICOM). Area responsibility for the
Middle East would be assigned t o USEUCOM
and area responsibiIity for South Asia would
be assigned to PACOM. The Mobile
Command, then, would have a responsibility
for North America, Central America, South
America, and Africa south of the Sahara. This
responsibility would include direction of
military assistance matters and contingency
planning. The likelihood of the employment
of US forces in these areas must be carefully
assessed, however, because contingency
planning consumes many man-hours,
computer-hours, and dollars, and we need not
be exquisitely prepared for the highly
improbable.

be retained. The other forces and military
activities, however, are smaller in scope than
those, say, in Texas and do not warrant a
unified c o m m a n d . Responsibility for
conventional defense of Alaska would be
assigned to the Mobile Command, while the
sea a p p r o a c h e s would remain t h e
responsibility of CINCPAC.
e USSOUTHCOM could be disestablished.
Defense of the Panama Canal and the
direction of military assistance matters in
Latin America would be assigned to the
Mobile Command.
0 LANTCOM
could be merged with
USEUCOM. LANTCOM is, in reality, a
specified c o m m a n d consisting almost
exclusively of naval forces. Although
CINCLANT has important functions as a
NATO commander (SACLANT), he could
perform these while serving as the naval
component commander within USEUCOM.
To be sure, some realignment of the NATO
structure would be necessary, but the Navy
would gain the advantage of concentrating
Atlantic and Mediterranean naval forces
(Second and Sixth Fleets) under one Navy
component commander, just as the First and
Seventh Fleets are under the command of the
Navy component commander in PACOM. In
terms of US and allied forces, geography, and
treaty commitments, Europe and the Atlantic
are no more complex than Asia and the
Pacific. There appears to be no practical bar
to the formation of a single unified command
for Europe and the Atlantic. Conversely, the
Fitzhugh proposal to merge LANTCOM and

Thus, for general purpose forces the
substance of the Fitzhugh proposals seems
sound, except that the super command is
superfluous, and LANTCOM should be
merged with USEUCOM, not USSTRICOM.
(The organization which would result if all
the foregoing proposals for both strategic and
general purpose combatant forces were
a d o p t e d i s s h o w n in Figure 2. A
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recapitulation and comparison of proposals is
contained in Figure 3.)
The only major change in the announced
reorganization of the unified command
structure involves USSTRICOM/USMEAFSA.
The headquarters will be redesignated the US
Readiness Command and will lose its area
responsibility for MEAFSA. Its general
responsibilities will be to provide a reserve of
combat ready forces to reinforce other
unified commands, and to assist the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in carrying out joint training
and developing joint doctrine. Thus, the new
Readiness Command will perform only the
last two of the five functions which were
discussed above as logical tasks for grouping
in a single, US-based, unified command for
general purpose forces.
While the redesignation of USSTRICOM
softens the image (perceived or real) of US
forces poised to intervene militarily at any
troublespot in the world, the reorganization
plan does not resolve other issues which are
identified in this article and which have been
warmly debated in Washington. Although
MEAFSA area responsibility has been
reassigned, there are no truly substantive
changes in the responsibilities of ALCOM,
LANTCOM, USEUCOM, PACOM, and

USSOUT/HCOM. Neither, as previously noted,
are there any changes in the responsibilities of
CONAD and SAC. Eight commands are retained.
The concept of a unified logistics command
h a s n o t b e e n explored because its
complexities require a separate analysis, and
because the report of the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel was not explicit concerning the
recommendation for a Logistics Command.
There appear to be valid reasons for moving in
that direction (such as economy, more
responsiveness, avoidance of duplication), but
the existing procedures for separate Service
logistic responsibilities do not seem amenable
to theater logistic commands a t this time.
Second, questions about the internal structure
of the unified commands (should component
commanders be deputies of the unified
command commander?) have not been
addressed because these too relate to the
doctrine of Service responsibility for raising
a n d administering forces. Finally, no
consideration has been given to the Fitzhugh
proposal to establish a Deputy Secretary of
Defense for Operations over the unified
commands. What has been presented is an
analysis of the combatant command structure
and how it could be improved by adopting
the best of Fitzhugh and other proposals.
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